Effects Of Corporate Governance and Financial Leverage of Quoted Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54878/46gw5z37Keywords:
Corporate Governance, Financial Leverage, Board Size, Board Independence, Board Diversity, Nigeria, Money Banks, Agency Theory, Trade-Off TheoryAbstract
This study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage of quoted Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria over the period 2015–2025. Specifically, it investigates the influence of board size, board independence, board composition, gender diversity, and age diversity on leverage levels of listed commercial banks in Nigeria. The study employs a descriptive research design using panel data from 15 quoted DMBs listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group over eleven years (2015–2025). Secondary data were extracted from the annual reports and accounts of the sampled banks. Panel regression models (fixed and random effects) were utilized for data analysis, with the Hausman test applied to determine the most appropriate model specification. Diagnostic tests for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and multicollinearity were also conducted. The empirical findings reveal that board size has a significant and positive effect on financial leverage (debt-to-equity ratio) at β = 0.1069 (P-value = 0.0028), consistent with the agency theory perspective that larger boards may facilitate greater debt utilization. Board independence also demonstrates a significant and positive effect on the debt-to-equity ratio at β = 0.0157 (P-value = 0.0000). Furthermore, gender diversity (β = 10.5572; P-value = 0.0000) and age diversity (β = 0.0741; P-value = 0.0132) are found to have significant positive effects on leverage decisions, suggesting that diverse boards are better equipped to assess and manage financial risks. The findings support the Trade-Off Theory, indicating that while high leverage may reduce performance, strong governance mechanisms can mitigate its negative effects. The study provides valuable insights for policymakers, regulators, bank executives, and investors regarding the governance-leverage nexus in the Nigerian banking industry. It extends previous research by incorporating recent data (2015–2025) and multiple governance variables, offering contemporary empirical evidence on the governance-leverage relationship in the Nigerian banking sector during a period of significant regulatory reforms and recapitalization efforts.
References
Abubakar, M., & Yakubu, S. (2025). Moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between capital structure and financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria. Journal of Accounting and Financial Management, 11(2), 45-67.
Adeyemi, O. O., & Fagbemi, T. O. (2023). Board diversity and financial performance of listed firms in Nigeria: A stakeholder theory perspective. Nigerian Journal of Accounting Research, 19(3), 112-129.
Ajayi, O. A., & Olatunji, O. C. (2020). Impact of board characteristics on auditor choice by deposit money banks in Nigeria. African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 7(2), 126-142.
Arping, S., & Sautner, Z. (2010). Corporate governance and leverage: Evidence from a natural experiment. Review of Finance, 14(3), 417-454.
Berger, A. N., & Patti, E. B. D. (2003). Capital structure and firm performance: A new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30(4), 1065-1102.
Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Macmillan.
Cadbury, A. (1992). The Code of Best Practice (Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance). Gee and Co Ltd.
Dikko, M. U. (2020). Recapitalization and corporate governance of the perceived performance of Nigerian banking sector. Universiti Teknologi Malaysia.
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49-64.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-155.
Hampton, J. J. (2001). Financial Decision Making: Concepts, Problems and Cases. Prentice Hall.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Kajola, S. O. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance: The case of Nigerian listed firms. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 14, 16-28.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 3-27.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59-77.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.
Nwosu, C. A., & Okonkwo, C. J. (2023). Corporate governance and financial leverage in Nigerian deposit money banks. International Journal of Banking and Finance, 10(2), 78-95.
Okafor, C. A., & Eze, O. C. (2024). Corporate governance and capital structure decisions of Nigerian listed firms: A moderating effect analysis. Journal of Corporate Governance Research, 8(1), 23-41.
Oyedele, O. (2025). Capital structure and financial performance of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria: Moderating role of corporate governance. Gusau Journal of Accounting and Finance, 6(3), 55-64.
Pass, C. (2004). Corporate governance and the role of non-executive directors in large UK companies: An empirical study. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(1), 32-42.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper & Row.
Rezaee, Z. (2009). Corporate Governance and Ethics. John Wiley & Sons.
Shaba, Y., & Maishanu, M. (2023). Governance mechanisms, debt structure and bank performance in Nigeria. International Journal of Advanced Research in Economics and Finance, 5(4), 112-128.
Spanos, L. (2005). Corporate governance and firm performance in Greece. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 1(4), 285-299.
Stulz, R. M. (1990). Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(1), 3-27.
Ubeh, P. C., & Nwoye, U. J. (2024). Board attributes and financial leverage of listed commercial banks in Nigeria. Journal of Contemporary Issues in Accounting, 5(1), 45-62.
Ubeh, P. C., Okoye, E. I., Nwoye, U. J., & Amahalu, N. N. (2024). Board diversity and financial leverage of listed commercial banks in Nigeria (2012-2022). Journal of Global Accounting, 10(1), 75-94.
Zwiebel, J. (1996). Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment. American Economic Review, 86(5), 1197-1215.